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ABSTRACT 
 
I carry out a power analysis of changes in voting weights and rules in the Nice Treaty of 
the EU on the widening and deepening of European integration, by applying methods that 
use Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. Significant decrease in voting power of small 
countries makes widening of integration more acceptable to incumbent members due to 
small size of the applicants. Relative increase in the conciliatory power of smaller 
members, and relative increase in the independent power of bigger members make 
smaller members compromise more in the coalitions they form, and improve the position 
of large members for further deepening of the integration. Lastly, the fairness analysis 
reveals a more federalist face for the EU in the way votes are distributed in Nice.  
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1. Introduction
  
 
The European Union leaders radically changed each member’s weight and the 
voting rules in the EU’s decision-making institutions in the Nice Treaty signed in 
December of 2000. This paper discusses these reforms, and analyzes their implications 
for the future of European integration using power indices. The main question it tries to 
answer is: Do these changes imply a more acceptable widening, and an easier deepening 
of the integration in Europe? After all, the often-stated reason in calls for reforms in the 
voting system before Nice was the fear of a stall in integration. Did the EU leaders 
successfully prevent that in Nice?   
The paper starts with an outline of the reforms in terms of realignment of voting 
weights, changes in voting rules, and the new areas where each voting rule applies in 
Section 2.    
Section 3 discusses the effects of the changes on the widening of the integration 
with the help of the Shapley-Shubik Index (1954) and the Banzhaf (1965) Index. 
Implications on costs of enlargement and power to be lost to new members are analyzed 
for widening the integration to Central and Eastern European countries.  
Section 4 compares the changes in independent versus conciliatory power 
coefficients of member countries. Relatively more conciliatory power implies members 
that are more willing to give compromises. Compromises are traditionally given when 
coalitions are formed to reach decisions. This section examines such implications of the 
                                                           
 The author has greatly benefited from the comments and suggestions from participants of 
seminars given at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies and the Nanovic Institute 
for European Studies. 2 
reforms on the voting power of France, Germany and the Benelux countries, which 
historically pursued further deepening of the integration, relative to coalitions that will be 
formed against them. 
Lastly, I examine what the reforms imply about the nature of the union in the 
future. German calls for a federal union, and the well-known British antipathy towards it 
makes this question an interesting one. Section 5 gives the implication of the reforms on 
this issue, using a fairness analysis of distribution of votes.   
Note that this paper does not analyze the effects of enlargements –the Eastern 
enlargement in particular- in the distribution of power within the EU. These are discussed 
in great detail in Widgren (1995), Hosli (1993), Peters (1996a), and others. This paper 
analyzes effects of the reforms on the future of European integration, including the 
implications for the Eastern enlargement. There is some recent research done using the 
reforms in Nice. Leech (2001) examines how a fair voting system can be designed using 
the scenarios of enlargement envisaged by the Nice Treaty. Felsenthal and Machover 
(2001) draw attention to ambiguities in the Nice Treaty regarding the voting rules.
1 
Finally, Baldwin et al. (2001) emphasize the increasing importance of enhanced 
cooperation arrangements after analyzing the ability of the EU’s Commission, Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament to affect EU decisions, in trying to answer if the 
Nice Treaty should be ratified. This paper analyzes the voting power distribution among 
member states within the Council of Ministers, i.e. members’ ability rather than that of 
                                                           
1 This paper adopts the voting rule that they describe as “[what] appears to be prescribed 
in the Nice Treaty”. 3 
institutions to affect the decisions, to examine the implications for the European 
integration.  
The main finding is that the reforms were on target. I find significant decreases in 
the voting power of small countries. Since most eastern applicants are small in size, this 
result implies lower costs of enlargement, and smaller loss of power to new members. 
Both make widening the integration much more acceptable to incumbent members. 
Furthermore, I find a relative increase in conciliatory power of small countries, and a 
relative increase in the independent power of major EU countries such as France and 
Germany. These changes improve the power of proponents for further deepening the 
integration, and at the same time, make smaller countries more willing to give 
compromises in the coalitions that they form. Finally, fairness analysis finds a more 
federalist union after the Nice Treaty.     
 
2. Changes in Nice Treaty   
Voting process in the EU involves three institutions: The European Parliament, 
where members’ voting practice reflects ideology rather than nationality; The European 
Commission, which has a supranational view, and the Council of Ministers, where 
national interests are pursued. The primary decisive body is the Council of Ministers. The 
research done on this matter reflects this division of power
2: The majority of work done 
is a voting power analysis of the Council of Ministers. Berg and Lane (1996), Hosli 
(1995, 1996), Laruelle and Widgren (1998), Peters (1996b) are such examples. Voting 
                                                           
2 For more on the division of power among EU institutions, refer to Laruelle and Widgren 
(1997). 4 
power analysis of the European Parliament has drawn much less attention: Hosli (1997), 
and Nurmi (1997). Since this paper’s topic is the influence of nationality, power 
distribution in the Council of Ministers is analyzed.  
Outcome of a voting depends on three things: the voting rule, the voting weights, 
and each voter’s behavior. Analysis of voter behavior is issue sensitive. Since preferences 
and agendas change frequently, an issue-by-issue approach is not always practical. 
Therefore, the analysis in this paper is based on power and satisfaction indices of 
cooperative games such as the Shapley-Shubik Index (1954) and the Banzhaf Index 
(1965). These indices do not model voters’ behavior, but they measure voters’ potential 
ability to change the results. The probabilistic approach offered by these indices is quite 
effective.
3 Detailed motivation for using power indices in such analyses is given in 
Baldwin et al. (1997).  
In the Council of Ministers, the most practiced rule is qualified majority; 
unanimity is required only on important issues.
4 The Nice Treaty expanded the use of the 
qualified majority rule: It will now be used in decisions regarding trade negotiations, 
certain aspects of visa, asylum and immigration policies, and structural spending for the 
EU’s poor regions. Unanimity is still required on issues regarding taxation and social 
security after the UK and Swedish opposition to adopt a majority rule. Furthermore, 
unanimity is the rule in trade negotiations involving cultural and audiovisual issues, 
                                                           
3 There has been some criticism of using power indices to study the EU by Garrett and 
Tsebelis (1999). Discussion of this criticism can be found in Lane and Berg (1999). 
4 Hosli (1993) gives the areas that require each voting rule prior the Nice reforms. 5 
human health and education services in the light of French opposition, and in defense and 
military issues after the UK, Irish, Swedish, Finnish and Austrian objections. 
The Nice Treaty defines the qualified majority as follows
5:   
Acts of the Council shall require for their adoption at least 258 votes in favour, cast 
by a majority of members, where this Treaty requires them to be adopted on a 
proposal from the Commissions.  
… 
When a decision is to be adopted by the Council by a qualified majority, a member 
of the Council may request verification that the member States constituting the 
qualified majority represent at least 62% of the total population of the Union. If that 
condition is shown not to have met, the decision in question shall not be adopted.6 
 
Note first that, Nice Treaty requires triple majority for proposals to be adopted: In 
addition to the traditional condition, where the number of votes need to exceed a given 
threshold, now, adoption of a proposal also requires simple majority of member 
countries, as well as a super majority of at least 62% of the population. Felsenthal and 
Machover (2001) analyze the implications of the last two majority conditions. They find 
that simple majority requirement is vacuous, and that the population requirement is 
nugatory. They conjecture that the voting can be recast as a pure weighted rule described 
                                                           
5 This is the voting rule for the usual procedure, where the proposal comes from the 
Commission. Under rare circumstances, decisions are taken outside this procedure. 
Therefore, I have confined the analysis to this normal procedure. 
6 Official Journal of the European Communities, C 80, p. 82. 6 
by the traditional condition. Secondly, the Nice Treaty changed the threshold to around 
75%, which was kept at around 71% for the history of the EU.
7    
However, the primary change in Nice is not the voting rule, but the realignment of 
the voting weights. Voting weight is simply share of a member’s votes in total. New and 
past distribution of votes and voting weights are given in Table 1. One important 
observation from Table 1 is that the methodology used in assigning votes to members had 
not changed since 1973, despite that the EU experienced three enlargements since then. 
Consequently, voting weights had changed only when new members joined in, each 
receiving the number of votes implied by the original system.
8 Only in the wake of 
Eastern enlargement, the EU decided to change the system, which changed not only the 
future but also the incumbent members’ votes, and voting weights. 
The next three sections analyze the implications of these reforms for the 
widening, deepening of the integration, and the degree of federalism in the EU. 
 
3. Widening the integration 
Voting weight allocation before Nice strongly favored small member states 
(Widgren, 1995). Small members used to get more votes relative to their population, and  
                                                           
7 This threshold is the percentage that will be used when the accession of all 12 applicants 
is complete. Nice Treaty leaves the threshold for the interim steps ambiguous, although it 
sets a minimum and maximum thresholds, which are both above the traditional 71%. 
8 Widgren (1994) observes a logarithmic relation between population size and number of 
votes assigned in the Council of Ministers. Pre-Nice distribution of votes in Table 1 is 
determined according to Widgren.  7 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1. Distribution of votes in the Council of Ministers of the EU 
 
  1958-1973 1973-1981 1981-1985 1986-1995 1995-2000 Pre-Nice Post-Nice
Belgium  2 (11.76%) 5 (8.62%) 5 (7.94%) 5 (6.58%) 5 (3.70%) 5 (3.70%) 12 (3.48%)
Luxembourg  1 (5.88%) 2 (3.45%) 2 (3.17%) 2 (2.63%) 2 (1.48%) 2 (1.48%) 4 (1.16%)
France  4 (23.53%) 10 (17.24%) 10 (15.87%) 10 (13.16%) 10 (7.41%) 10 (7.41%) 29 (8.41%)
Germany  4 (23.53%) 10 (17.24%) 10 (15.87%) 10 (13.16%) 10 (7.41%) 10 (7.41%) 29 (8.41%)
The Netherlands  2 (11.76%) 5 (8.62%) 5 (7.94%) 5 (6.58%) 5 (3.70%) 5 (3.70%) 13 (3.77%)
Italy  4 (23.53%) 10 (17.24%) 10 (15.87%) 10 (13.16%) 10 (7.41%) 10 (7.41%) 29 (8.41%)
The UK  10 (17.24%) 10 (15.87%) 10 (13.16%) 10 (7.41%) 10 (7.41%) 29 (8.41%)
Denmark  3 (5.17%) 3 (4.76%) 3 (3.95%) 3 (2.22%) 3 (2.22%) 7 (2.03%)
Ireland  3 (5.17%) 3 (4.76%) 3 (3.95%) 3 (2.22%) 3 (2.22%) 7 (2.03%)
Greece  5 (7.94%) 5 (6.58%) 5 (3.70%) 5 (3.70%) 12 (3.48%)
Spain  8 (10.53%) 8 (5.93%) 8 (5.93%) 27 (7.83%)
Portugal  5 (6.58%) 5 (3.70%) 5 (3.70%) 12 (3.48%)
Austria  4 (2.96%) 4 (2.96%) 10 (2.90%)
Sweden  4 (2.96%) 4 (2.96%) 10 (2.90%)
Finland  3 (2.22%) 3 (2.22%) 7 (2.03%)
The Czech Rep.  5 (3.70%) 12 (3.48%)
Poland  8 (5.93%) 27 (7.83%)
Hungary  5 (3.70%) 12 (3.48%)
Slovenia  3 (2.22%) 4 (1.16%)
Estonia  3 (2.22%) 4 (1.16%)
Cyprus  2 (1.48%) 4 (1.16%)
Malta  2 (1.48%) 3 (0.87%)
Bulgaria  4 (2.96%) 10 (2.90%)
Romania  7 (5.19%) 14 (4.06%)
The Slovak Rep.  3 (2.22%) 7 (2.03%)
Latvia  3 (2.22%) 4 (1.16%)
Lithuania  3 (2.22%) 7 (2.03%)
TOTAL  17 58 63 76 87 135 345
Q. Majority  12(70.6%) 41(70.7%) 45(71.4%) 54(71.1%) 62(71.3) 96(71%) 258(74.8%)
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the opposite for large members. Candidates in Eastern enlargement are smaller than the 
EU average. Before Nice, this created concerns in incumbent members, especially in big 
ones, which feared too much loss of power to small eastern countries and the potential 
implications for the costs of the enlargement as mentioned in Kandogan  (2000). 
Voting weights are poor measures of member countries’ influence on EU 
decisions. Especially small members tend to have a bigger influence than what their 
voting weight suggests. This influence, or voting power, is defined as the probability that 
a country exerts power in all possible coalitions. In other words, the number of times in 
all outcomes a country’s vote is crucial –i.e. it turns a losing coalition into a winning 
one– shows that country’s power. Extensive non-technical explanation of voting power is 
given in Felsenthal and Machover (2000).  
Voting power of a country i in a group of n countries is formulized below, 
following Owen (1972): 
) 1 (                                                                                                  
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where S is any coalition of s countries. Mi are the minimum winning coalitions, in which 
country i is crucial. N is the set of all n countries, and xk is the probability that country k 
votes in favor the proposal in question. Distribution of xks defines how coalitions are 
formed. There are two standard assumptions regarding coalition formation: Independence 
and homogeneity.   
Independence assumption yields the Banzhaf Index (BI), where xks are 
independently uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Each outcome has equal probability of 9 
occurring. In other words, all combinations of coalitions have equal probability of 
formation: 
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Homogeneity gives out the Shapley-Shubik Index (SSI), where there is a common 
standard by which voters evaluate each outcome, and thus the probabilities of voters’ 
decisions are correlated (Straffin, 1988), i.e. xk = x, and x is uniformly distributed on [0, 
1]. Under homogeneity, all sizes of coalitions are equally possible, and all different 
coalitions of a certain size have equal probability of formation. In other words, all 
permutations of coalitions are equally likely: 
) 3 (                                                                                                            
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Independence assumes no communication, whereas homogeneity assumes some 
communication or reconciliation between voters. This is why Straffin (1988) conjectures 
that the SSI is more appropriate in the analysis of voting bodies with considerable 
communication between voters, and compromises after a bargaining process, such as the 
Council of Ministers. However, Banzhaf index should not be discarded in this 
framework, since it has its own interesting interpretations as discussed in the next two 
sections. Felsenthal and Machover (1998) give detailed technical explanation of these 
indices.  
Table 2 gives the ratio of voting power to population weight before and after Nice 
to reveal the bias towards smaller countries. Applicant and member countries are ordered 
from the smallest, Malta, to the largest, Germany, in terms of population weights. With  10 
 
 
 
 
          TABLE 2. Ratio of voting power to population weight 
 
Country  
Pop. 
Weight 
(PW) 
Pre-Nice
SSI/PW 
Post-Nice
SSI/PW 
 
Pre-Nice
BI/PW 
 
Post-Nice 
BI/PW 
Malta  0.08% 18.28 10.67 19.81 12.06
Luxembourg  0.09% 16.04 12.59 17.38 14.04
Cyprus  0.16% 9.11 7.15 9.87 7.97
Estonia  0.30% 7.21 3.77 7.74 4.20
Slovenia  0.41% 5.24 2.74 5.62 3.05
Latvia  0.51% 4.28 2.24 4.59 2.49
Lithuania  0.77% 2.81 2.55 3.02 2.86
Ireland  0.78% 2.77 2.51 2.98 2.82
Finland  1.07% 2.01 1.83 2.16 2.05
Denmark  1.11% 1.95 1.77 2.10 1.99
The Slovak Rep.  1.12% 1.93 1.75 2.07 1.96
Austria  1.68% 1.73 1.68 1.83 1.85
Bulgaria  1.71% 1.71 1.65 1.81 1.82
Sweden  1.84% 1.58 1.53 1.67 1.69
Portugal  2.08% 1.76 1.64 1.84 1.79
Hungary  2.09% 1.75 1.63 1.82 1.77
Belgium  2.13% 1.72 1.60 1.79 1.75
The Czech Rep.  2.14% 1.71 1.59 1.78 1.74
Greece  2.19% 1.67 1.55 1.74 1.69
The Netherlands  3.28% 1.11 1.12 1.16 1.21
Romania  4.67% 1.12 0.86 1.11 0.92
Poland  8.03% 0.75 0.99 0.73 0.92
Spain  8.19% 0.73 0.98 0.71 0.90
Italy  11.98% 0.64 0.72 0.58 0.64
France  12.18% 0.63 0.71 0.57 0.63
The UK  12.36% 0.62 0.70 0.56 0.62
Germany  17.06% 0.45 0.51 0.41 0.45
         Note: Bold rows are for the applicant countries. 
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the exception of 6-7 big countries, all countries enjoy higher voting power than what their 
population implies. Clearly, small countries are favored in the distribution of votes before 
and after Nice. However, changes in the ratios show that after Nice, small countries 
experienced a decrease in voting power, whereas large countries gained. Now, the 
number of votes assigned better reflects the population size.  
These results are fortified by the regressions given in Table 3, where voting power 
of each country, measured by SSI or BI, is regressed against its population weight in the 
EU, separately before and after the Nice IGC. After Nice, R
2 goes up, intercepts get 
closer to zero, the coefficients of the population weight approach to zero, and t-statistics 
for the intercepts go down, whereas those for the population weight go up. When BI is 
used to measure voting power, the changes observed are more pronounced. Apparently, 
the changes had a more significant effect on countries’ independent power than their 
conciliatory power measured by SSI.  
An interesting observation is the position of applicant countries relative to 
incumbent members. The changes in power to population weight ratios, and the average 
changes applied to incumbent members are given in Figure 1. The decrease in applicant 
countries’ ratio is far greater than that of small incumbent members with similar 
population, except the biggest applicant, Poland. Especially, Malta, Estonia, Slovenia, 
Latvia, and Romania had the worst treatments. The fact that the applicant countries were 
not part of the negotiations in Nice when the new voting weights are decided makes this 
observation interesting.  
Kandogan (2000) analyzes the relation between voting power and budgetary costs 
of enlargements. He finds that a country’s voting power and the power of the coalition it  12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE  3.  Regression results 
 
Power Index  Period  Constant  Log(PopulationWeight) Adj. R
2 
 
Pre-Nice 
-0.86 
(-22.66) 
 
0.35 
(17.35) 
0.92   
 
  SSI 
 
Post-Nice 
-0.67 
(-14.14) 
0.48 
(19.26) 
 
0.94 
 
Pre-Nice 
-0.91 
(-28.40) 
0.31 
(18.51) 
 
0.88   
 
BI 
 
Post-Nice 
-0.73 
(-18.14) 
0.44 
(20.39) 
0.94 
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       FIGURE 1. Effects on applicant countries 
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is part of are critical in explaining its receipts from the EU budget. To reduce the costs of 
Eastern enlargement, he suggests that votes need to be redistributed more proportionally 
to population, and the threshold needs to be lowered. At Nice, the first suggestion is 
carried out, but contrary to the second suggestion, the EU increased the number of votes 
to obtain a qualified majority, from around 71% to 75%. Despite this, the reweighing of 
votes in Nice still reduced applicant countries’ voting power, and because of that, the 
coalitions they may be part of have smaller power. Thus, the budgetary cost of Eastern 
enlargement is expected to be much lower than what pre-Nice vote distribution implied.  
Using SSI, the total power loss to applicant countries upon membership was 
35.1% of the potential power of all EU before Nice, and it is 30.9% after. If BI is used to 
measure power, the loss goes down from 36.4% to 32.6%. These are significant decreases 
achieved only by the realignment of voting weights. Fear of losing power can also be 
remedied by lowering the required number of votes for majority or by increasing the 
number of issues requiring qualified majority rather than unanimity.
9 Although the Nice 
treaty increased the threshold, it adopted the qualified majority rule for more issues, 
which helps reduce the loss of power to new members on decisions regarding those 
issues.  
In sum, the new allocation of voting weights will likely reduce the costs of 
enlargement. This and the fact that there is a decrease in loss of power to new members 
                                                           
9 The idea is simple: When the threshold is 100%, all members have equal power. As the 
threshold is lowered small members become less crucial in the outcome; and they lose 
power. In turn, bigger members gain power. Leech (2001) illustrates this relationship 
between the threshold and the voting power. 15 
make the enlargement, the widening part of integration easier and more acceptable to the 
incumbent members.  
  
4. Deepening the integration 
This section exploits the differences in assumptions used in getting the power 
indices to analyze the effects of the Nice Treaty on the future of deepening the European 
integration. SSI index measures power of countries when all countries act conciliatory. BI 
assumes that all countries act independently. The power coefficient, which is the ratio 
between these indices and voting weight, measures a country’s relative power. 
Comparison of power coefficients using SSI, and BI, tells whether a country will act in a 
more conciliatory way by forming coalitions, or act more independently on its own. Since 
the power indices sum to 1 across countries, while some countries will lose their 
independent power relative to their conciliatory power, some will gain. As a result, some 
countries will try to form coalitions, whereas some will act independently. This makes 
measuring voting power of countries using SSI or BI not feasible, since both require that 
all countries behave in a similar fashion. Therefore, in this section, I develop a simple 
index that measures the power of countries under partial homogeneity, where blocs of 
countries vote independently, and within-bloc decisions are taken in a conciliatory way.     
Table 4 gives the changes in power coefficients computed using SSI and BI after 
the Nice Treaty. The effects on small countries and the big countries are different. Small 
member countries, like Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Sweden, and Finland, 
and small candidates, like Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia, and Lithuania lost 
both their independent and conciliatory power. In particular, they have lost more  16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4. Changes in independent and conciliatory power coefficient (PC) 
 
Country  ∆PC w/ SSI ∆PC w/ BI
Malta -12.69% -48.34%
Luxembourg -12.15% -48.48%
Cyprus -12.15% -48.48%
Estonia -8.33% -27.40%
Slovenia -8.33% -27.40%
Latvia -8.33% -27.40%
Lithuania -6.67% -27.65%
Ireland -6.67% -27.65%
Finland -6.67% -27.65%
Denmark -6.67% -27.65%
The Slovak Rep.  -6.67% -27.65%
Austria -7.01% -12.26%
Bulgaria -7.01% -12.26%
Sweden -7.01% -12.26%
Portugal -4.45% 5.91%
Hungary -4.45% 5.91%
Belgium -4.45% 5.91%
The Czech Rep.  -4.45% 5.91%
Greece -4.45% 5.91%
The Netherlands  -4.81% 5.46%
Romania -1.96% 32.76%
Poland 4.31% 30.66%
Spain  4.31% 30.66%
Italy 9.15% 49.04%
France 9.15% 49.04%
The UK  9.15% 49.04%
Germany 9.15% 49.04%
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independent power, which induces more cooperation by forming coalitions among 
themselves. The effect on bigger countries is almost the opposite. France, UK, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, and the applicant Poland gained power on both accounts. In particular, their 
independent power increased significantly. Accordingly, these countries are likely to act 
alone in the future. 
This analysis implies that in the future we may no longer see the Franco-German 
Alliance that was impeccable in the past since the Elysee Treaty of 1963. We have 
already started signs of this on recent issues like a European constitution, contributions to 
the EU Budget, the agricultural subsidies, and Germany’s dominance of Eastern Europe. 
Despite these differences, both countries share the same interests over issues discussed in 
this paper, such as deepening of the integration. Therefore, they are likely to keep voting 
in the same direction on integration issues.  
Consequently, France, Germany and the other big countries (The UK, Italy, 
Spain, and Poland) are likely to act independently in the future, whereas small countries 
are likely to join powers in blocs with other countries in similar situations. Cooperation is 
likely among the CEEC, with the exception of Poland, upon membership since they share 
common background and concerns. Other small incumbent EU members and applicants 
with similar interests will form their own counter-blocs: Mediterranean countries 
(Portugal, Greece, Malta and Cyprus), Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden and 
Finland), and Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). Ireland is 
likely to act along with the Mediterranean bloc because of similar income levels, and 
Austria with its Scandinavian with their former partners in EFTA.  18 
Partial homogeneity where there are independent blocs, which are homogenous 
within, is needed in this situation to better explain the power of each country. Under 
partial homogeneity, the distribution of power among the blocs assumes independence as 
in the Banzhaf index, and the distribution of the bloc’s power among its participants 
assumes homogeneity as in the Shapley-Shubik index. Accordingly, the power of a 
country i in a bloc Bi with bi members is the bloc’s power in a group of ns blocs times 
country i’s power within the bloc: 
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where S is any coalition of blocs. 
i B M are the minimum winning coalitions, where Bi is 
crucial. S
’ is any coalition within the bloc. Mi are the minimum winning coalitions within 
that bloc, where country i is crucial.  
Table 5 gives the power of each country to affect the EU decisions once these 
blocs are formed, measured according to partial homogeneity.
10 The countries are ordered 
from the smallest to largest in terms of population weight. Small incumbent members,  
                                                           
10 The power indices given in the table assume simple majority voting rule in the 
distribution of power within a bloc, since countries in the blocs act conciliatory. When 
compared to SSI or BI, although the power of a country according to partial homogeneity 
is affected by the particular coalition the country is in, one observes some patterns: 
Partial homogeneity implies larger power for small countries than what SSI and BI 
implies. Furthermore, the power of large countries according to partial homogeneity lies 
in between SSI and BI, larger than BI, smaller than SSI.  19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5. Power according to partial homogeneity (PPH)  
 
Country 
Pre-Nice 
PPH 
Post-Nice
PPH Change
Malta 0.018  0.008  -55.2%
Luxembourg 0.044  0.040 -9.3%
Cyprus 0.018  0.008  -55.2%
Estonia 0.017  0.010  -42.5%
Slovenia 0.017  0.010  -42.5%
Latvia 0.017  0.010  -42.5%
Lithuania 0.017  0.017  0.1%
Ireland 0.018  0.028  56.8%
Finland 0.012  0.013  9.3%
Denmark 0.012  0.013  9.3%
The Slovak Rep.  0.017  0.017  0.1%
Austria 0.024  0.026  9.3%
Bulgaria 0.032  0.023  -28.1%
Sweden 0.024  0.026  9.3%
Portugal 0.040  0.038  -5.4%
Hungary 0.032  0.032  -0.4%
Belgium 0.044  0.040  -9.3%
The Czech Rep.  0.032  0.032  -0.4%
Greece 0.040  0.038  -5.4%
The Netherlands  0.044  0.040  -9.3%
Romania 0.064  0.046  -28.3%
Poland 0.064  0.079  23.2%
Spain 0.064  0.079  23.2%
Italy 0.072  0.081  12.7%
France 0.072  0.081  12.7%
The UK  0.072  0.081  12.7%
Germany 0.072  0.081  12.7%
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Mediterranean members, and all CEEC with the exception Poland lost power, whereas 
big incumbent members, Scandinavian members, and Poland, gained power after Nice. 
Considering that the relatively poor countries, like CEEC and the Mediterranean bloc 
might have the hardest time in adjusting the deepening integration, and thus will likely be 
against it, and that the rich Scandinavian countries, and big countries like France and 
Germany, which are traditionally supporters of further deepening, this realignment 
creates fewer problems in any further integration efforts. The only drawback is the 
increased power of the UK and Sweden, which have been reluctant towards deepening 
efforts in the past.  
 
5. Fairness and Federalism in the EU 
The question of fairness is explored in detail by Laruelle and Widgren (1998). 
Their conclusion is that fairness depends on the definition of the EU: If the EU is 
considered to be a unitary state, every EU elector should have one vote. If the EU is just 
an association of states, then every state should have one vote. Considering that voting 
power of countries reflects these, they find that the voting weights and the implied voting 
power in the EU at the time were not fair in both cases.  
A federal EU lies between these two cases. In a federal system, decision-making 
occurs in two stages: Voters from each state elect their representatives, and 
representatives from each state vote in the central government. In the EU context, the first 
stage is the ordinary political process in which voters in each member country elect their 
government. Then, the elected governments’ ministers vote in the Council of Ministers. 
Due to this two-stage decision-making process, electors in smaller states are more 21 
powerful in the decisions taken than those in larger states. Penrose (1946) formulated that 
each state in a federal union should have power equal to square root of that state’s 
population. Completing Laruelle and Widgren (1998) work with Penrose’s formulation, 
one can write the absolute voting power of a country i as follows: 
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The above formulation implies the following normalized voting power for country 
i:  
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Consequently, by computing the power x that best fits the voting power implied 
by the new voting weights, I measure the effect of the Nice realignment on the perceived 
degree of federalism in the EU by its leaders who decided on the new voting weights 
Figure 2 gives the plot of voting power measured by Banzhaf Index
11 against the 
population weight before and after the Nice realignment, and how it would be under 
different definitions of the EU. As can be seen from the figure, the Nice realignment  
                                                           
11 The model behind Laruelle and Widgren (1998) is only applicable for Banzhaf index. 22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Degree of federalism after Nice 
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moved the EU further away from the case of association, where x = 0, closer to the case 
of federal union, where x = 1/2. In particular, the degree of federalism changes from 0.35 
to 0.45 due to the changes in voting weights after Nice. In the previous stages of the EU 
integration, this degree varied around 0.37.
12 Apparently, the EU leaders’ vision of the 
EU is a much more federalist union, since they realigned the voting weights accordingly. 
 
6. Conclusions  
Baldwin et al. (2001) analyze the effects of the Nice Treaty on the EU’s 
Commission and the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. They conclude 
that the increased threshold by the Nice Treaty lowers the Council of Minister’s ability to 
make decisions, and indirectly the power of the Commission and the European 
Parliament suffer too. They conjecture that further integration in the EU is only possible 
if channeled by enhanced cooperation arrangements. Their analysis is based on the 
change in the threshold, and the effects of changes in voting weights are not carefully 
considered. This paper analyzes the effects of the changes in voting weights in the 
Council coupled with the increase in threshold on the future of the integration in Europe.  
A simple comparison of voting weights shows that small countries in the EU are 
still favored after the Nice realignment of votes, although the bias towards them is now 
significantly lower. Particularly, predominantly small applicant countries experienced a 
much larger decrease in their voting weights than the small incumbent members. Voting 
power analysis using Shapley-Shubik Index, and the Banzhaf Index fortified this result 
                                                           
12 In EU6, x=0.363; in EU9, x=0.357; in EU10, x=0.392; in EU12, x=0.374; in EU15, 
x=0.387. 24 
by finding a voting power distribution that is now much more aligned with population 
weights. This decreased the power of small countries like the applicant Eastern 
Europeans despite an increase in the number of votes required for majority. This change 
and the increased use of majority voting imply a much smaller loss of power to future 
new members, as well as decreased cost of enlargement. Overall, the fears of enlargement 
are lessened, which makes the widening of the European integration more feasible. 
Independent versus conciliatory power analysis implies a relatively bigger loss of 
independent power for small countries, and bigger gains for large countries. These make 
small countries more willing to give concessions, and enable big countries such as France 
and Germany to pursue their dream of deeper integration. The power of priori blocs 
measured under partial homogeneity has increased for big countries and rich 
Scandinavian countries, which are likely to benefit most from a deeper integration. 
Coalition power of East Europeans, and the Mediterranean countries decreased, which 
are the countries that will have the hardest time adopting. All these changes make 
deepening the integration easier.  
Lastly, an analysis of fairness reveals a more federal EU in the future. 
Considering all of these results, it looks like the Nice Summit was successful in ensuring 
future efforts in all aspects of integration in Europe.  
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